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[Αλντεμπαράν]

1 χρόνο πριν...

‘OXI, OXI!’: Tens of thousands chant ‘No’ to bailout conditions as Tsipras addresses crowd


<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mNxHc6qMotg" target="_blank">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mNxHc6qMotg</a>

[galletti]

Και μετα ηρθαν οι μελισσες

[Katarameno]

1 χρόνο πριν...

‘OXI, OXI!’: Tens of thousands chant ‘No’ to bailout conditions as Tsipras addresses crowd

Αυτό είναι καλύτερο βίντεο (από το Russia Today)

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24R7clfqJp0" target="_blank">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24R7clfqJp0</a>

Ruptly ->
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zDjy9S4RQ4" target="_blank">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zDjy9S4RQ4</a>

[Katarameno]

g, όπως σου γραψα και σε πριβέ, το κόβω οτι το καλύτερο που έχουμε να κάνουμε είναι να πάμε για καμιά μπύρα, να τα πούμε ζωντανά face to face για να βγάλουμε άκρη. Για σήμερα δεν αντέχω άλλο μπροστά στο πλεκτρολέγιο, λελ. 

σωστό και δεκτό. 

Ναι αλλά ακόμα δεν έχουμε πάει για μπύρα. 

[Katarameno]

...

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbWE7MlCE_k" target="_blank">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbWE7MlCE_k</a>

[Katarameno]

Ανεπίσημο και με περιορισμένη ευθύνη (σα να λέμε μονοπρόσωπη Ε.Π.Ε. = Εταιρία Περιορισμένης Ευθύνης) το Eurogroup... (Ακαταδίωκτο?)
Δεν μπορεί να "κριθεί" σε Ευρωπαϊκό Επίπεδο (!!!???) Να πάμε σε ηλιακό δικαστήριο να το κρίνει τότε. Η κοροϊδία σε όλο της το μεγαλείο...
10 χρόνια λιτότητας μας επέβαλλε ένα ανεπίσημο όργανο της ΕΕ. Μπράβο μας. Τα λεγε ο Βαρουφάκης, αλλά τον βρίζουν ακόμα κάποιοι.

Abstract: In the Chrysostomides case (joined cases C-597/18 P, C-598/18 P, C-603/18 P and C-604/18 P Council v Chrysostomides & Co. and Others ECLI:EU:C:2020:1028), the Court of Justice (ECJ) confirmed its previous finding that the Eurogroup has only an informal and intergovernmental nature. Building on the cases Ledra and Mallis, the ECJ finally denied the respective possibilities of EU legal protection against acts and conduct of the Eurogroup. Moreover, the ECJ denied the binding nature of art. 2(6)(b) of Council Decision (EU) 2013/236, a decision with which the conditionality of the macro-economic adjustment programme had been brought under the auspices of EU law. As a consequence, the Eurogroup’s acts and conduct as well as conditionality measures cannot be reviewed on the EU level.

I. Introduction
In December 2020, the Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered a long-awaited judgment in the case Chrysostomides[1] where it once more addressed the Cypriot measures adopted in the course of the European sovereign debt crisis of the last decade.[2]

Several idiosyncrasies of the Cypriot banking sector[3] have led to the crisis: a) the Cypriot banking sector was considerably large compared to the economy (the domestic sector was over six times the gross domestic product (GDP).[4] b) The two largest lenders, Bank of Cyprus and Laiki (covering two thirds of the banking sector and four times GDP) invested in high risk and eventually non-performing loans: Greek government bonds.[5] Thus the Greek haircut spread contagion to the Cypriot banking sector, as the two banks lost nearly 80 percent of the capital base, which caused the necessity of external resources.[6] Financial assistance provided by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was made conditional on the compliance with certain adjustment measures.[7]

Two questions were most central for the case: 1) Does the Eurogroup form a body of EU law in sense of art. 340(2) TFEU? 2) Did art. 2(6)(b) of Council Decision (EU) 2013/236[8] impose specific measures on Cyprus to restore financial stability and sustainable growth, without any margin of discretion?

...
It should be noted not only that the term “informally” is used in the wording of Protocol No 14 on the Eurogroup, annexed to the TFEU Treaty, but also that the Eurogroup is not among the different configurations of the Council of the European Union:[26] 56] While the ECJ found that the Eurogroup does not form a configuration of the Council,[57] its ministerial members[58] are the same Member State representative who are part of the Ecofin Council,[59] the ESM Board of Governors,[60] and, in some cases, also the IMF Board of Governors.[61]


V. Conclusions
In the Chrysostomides case, the ECJ built on its case law (Ledra and Mallis) and re-confirmed the Eurogroup’s informal and intergovernmental nature. As a consequence, the Eurogroup cannot be held accountable for its acts and conducts before the EU courts, since neither an action for annulment (art. 263(4) TFEU), nor an action for damages (art. 340(2) TFEU) can be invoked. Even by challenging the acts and conduct of the Council, the Commission or the ECB, that lacuna cannot not be compensated entirely. While informal discussion forums certainly have their raison d'être, in the present circumstances, the Council could trial run its plans in the Eurogroup without facing any consequences and later adopt the least opposed option.

Before, the Chrysostomides case, it has regularly been mentioned in the literature that even if MoUs adopted with euro area Member States cannot be contested on the EU level, at least, the validity of the respective Council Decisions repeating the gist of the MoU can be challenged. Now, concerning art. 2(6)(b) of Decision (EU) 2013/236 even that option has been excluded by the ECJ.

https://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/europeanforum/court-justice-self-restraint-reviewing-financial-assistance-conditionality