THMMY.gr

Major concepts:


Existence precedes essence

A central proposition of existentialism is that existence precedes essence, which means that the actual life of the individual is what constitutes what could be called his or her "essence" instead of there being a predetermined essence that defines what it is to be a human. In other words, you could say that the claim that is being made is that the "essence" of human beings is to be who, not what they are. Although it was Sartre who explicitly coined the term, similar notions can be found in the thought of many existentialist philosophers, from Kierkegaard to Heidegger.

It is often claimed in this context that man defines himself, which is often perceived as stating that man can "wish" to be something - anything, a bird, for instance - and then be it. According to Sartre's own account, however, this would rather be a kind of bad faith. What is meant by the statement is that man is (1) defined only insofar as he acts and (2) that he is responsible for his actions. To clarify, it can be said that a man who acts cruelly towards other people is, by that act, defined as a cruel man and in that same instance, he (as opposed to his genes, or "the cruel nature of man," for instance) is defined as being responsible for being this cruel man. As Sartre puts it in his Existentialism is a Humanism: "man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards." Of course, the more positive therapeutic aspect of this is also implied: You can choose to act in a different way, and to be a good person instead of a cruel person. Here it is also clear that since man can choose to be either cruel or good, he is, in fact, neither of these things essentially.

A focus on concrete existence

As seen in this first central proposition, existentialist thinkers focus on the question of concrete human existence and the conditions of this existence rather than determining a human essence. However, even though the concrete individual existence must be the primary source of information in existentialism, certain conditions are commonly held to be "endemic" to human existence. These conditions are usually in some way related to the inherent meaninglessness or absurdity of the earth and its apparent contrast with our pre-reflexive lived lives which normally present themselves to us as meaningful. When our meaningful representations of the world break down (which they may do at any time, and for any reason - from a tragedy to a particularly insightful moment on the side of the individual), and we are put face to face with the naked meaninglessness of the world, the results can be devastating. It is in relation to this that Albert Camus famously claimed that "there is only one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide." Although "prescriptions" vary, from Kierkegaard's religious "stage" to Camus' insistence on persevering in spite of absurdity, the concern with helping people avoid living their lives in ways that put them in the perpetual danger of having everything meaningful break down is common to most existentialist philosophers.

Dread

Dread, sometimes called angst, anxiety or even anguish is a term that is common to many existentialist thinkers. Although its concrete properties may vary slightly, it is generally held to be the experience of our freedom and responsibility. The archetypal example is the example of the experience one has when standing on a cliff where one not only fears falling off it, but also dreads the possibility of throwing oneself off. In this experience that "nothing is holding me back," one senses the lack of anything that predetermines you to either throw yourself off or to stand still, and one experiences one's own freedom.

It is also claimed, most famously by Sartre, that dread is the fear of nothing (no thing). This relates both to the inherent insecurity about the consequences of one's actions (related to the absurdity of the world), and to the fact that, in experiencing one's freedom, one also realises that one will be fully responsible for these consequences; there is no thing in you (your genes, for instance) that acts and that you can "blame" if something goes wrong. Of course, most of us only have short and shallow encounters with this kind of dread, as not every choice is perceived as having dreadful possible consequences (and, it can be claimed, our lives would be unbearable if every choice facilitated dread), but that doesn't change the fact that freedom remains a condition of every action. Søren Kierkegaard, in his The Concept of Dread, maintains that dread, when experienced by the young child in facing the possibility of responsibility for his actions, is one of the main forces in the child's individuation. As such, the very condition of freedom can be said to be a part of any individual's self.

Bad faith

Bad faith is seen as any denial of free will by lying to oneself about one's self and freedom. This can take many forms, from convincing oneself that some form of determinism is true, to a sort of "mimicry" where one acts as "one should." How "one" should act is often determined by an image one has of how one such as oneself (say, a bank manager) acts. This image usually corresponds to some sort of social norm. This does not mean that all acting in accordance with social norms is bad faith: The main point is the attitude one takes to one's own freedom, and the extent to which one acts in accordance with this freedom. A sign of bad faith can be something like the denial of responsibility for something one has done on the grounds that one just did "as one does" or that one's genes determined one to do as one did. Lying to oneself might appear impossible or contradictory. Sartre denies the subconscious the power to do this, and he claims that the person who is lying to himself has to be aware that he is lying - that he isn't determined, or this "thing" he makes himself out to be. Consider how far someone is (or you are) aware of lying in the cases of self-deception where someone adheres to comfortable but false beliefs and acting where both audience and actors collude in a make-believe world.

Freedom

The existentialist concept of freedom is often misunderstood as a sort of liberum arbitrium where almost anything is possible and where values are inconsequential to choice and action. This interpretation of the concept is often related to the insistence on the absurdity of the world and that there are no relevant or absolutely "good" or "bad" values. However, that there are no values to be found in the world in-itself doesn't mean that there are no values: each of us usually already has his or her values before a consideration of their validity is carried through, and it is, after all, upon these values we act. In Kierkegaard's Judge Vilhelm's account in Either/Or, making "choices" without allowing one's values to confer differing values to the alternatives, is, in fact, choosing not to make a choice - to "flip a coin," as it were, and to leave everything to chance. This is considered to be a refusal to live in the consequence of one's freedom, meaning it quickly becomes a sort of bad faith. As such, existentialist freedom isn't situated in some kind of abstract space where everything is possible: since people are free, and since they already exist in the world, it is implied that their freedom is only in this world, and that it, too, is restricted by it.

What isn't implied in this account of existential freedom, however, is that one's values are immutable; a consideration of one's values may cause one to reconsider and change them (though this rarely happens). A consequence of this fact is that one is not only responsible for one's actions, but also for the values one holds. This entails that a reference to "common values" doesn't "excuse" the individual's actions, because, even though these are the values of the society the individual is part of, they are also his or her own in the sense that s/he could choose them to be different at any time. Thus, the focus on freedom in existentialism is related to the limits of the responsibility one bears as a result of one's freedom: the relationship between freedom and responsibility is one of interdependency, and a clarification of freedom also clarifies what one is responsible for.

Facticity

A concept closely related to freedom is that of facticity. It is defined by Sartre in Being and Nothingness as that in-itself which you are in the mode of not being it. This can be more easily understood when considering it in relation to the temporal dimension of past: Your past is what you are in the sense that it co-constitutes you. However, to say that you are only your past would be to ignore a large part of reality (the present and the future) while saying that your past is what you were, would entirely detach it from you, which would rather be a kind of bad faith.

In relation to freedom, facticity is both a limitation and a condition of your freedom. It is a limitation in that a large part of your facticity consists of things you couldn't have chosen (birthplace, etc), but a condition in the sense that your values most likely will depend on it.

Even though your facticity is "set in stone" (as being past, for instance), it cannot determine you. However, to disregard your facticity when you, in the continual process of self-making, project yourself into the future, would be to put yourself in denial of yourself, and thus to put yourself in bad faith. In other words, the origin of your projection will still have to be your facticity, although in the mode of not being it (essentially).

The Other and The Look

The Other (when written with a capitalised "o") is a concept more properly belonging to phenomenology and its account of intersubjectivity. However, the concept has seen widespread use in existentialist writings, and the conclusions drawn from it differ slightly from the phenomenological accounts. The experience of the Other is the experience of another free subject who inhabits the same world as you do. In its most basic form, it is this experience of the Other that constitutes intersubjectivity and objectivity. To clarify, when one experiences someone else, and that this Other person experiences the world (the same world that you experience), only from "over there," the world itself is constituted as objective in that it is something that is "there" as identical for both of the subjects; you experience the other person as experiencing the same as you. This experience of the Other's look is what is termed the Look (sometimes The Gaze).

While this experience, in its basic phenomenological sense, constitutes the world as objective, and yourself as objectively existing subjectivity (you experience yourself as seen in the Other's Look in precisely the same way that you experience the Other as seen by you, as subjectivity), in existentialism, it also acts as a kind of limitation of your freedom. This is because the Look tends to objectify what it sees. As such, when one experiences oneself in the Look, one doesn't experience oneself as nothing (no thing), but as something. Sartre's own example of a man peeping at someone through a keyhole can help clarify this: At first, this man is entirely caught up in the situation he is in; he is in a pre-reflexive state where his entire consciousness is directed at what goes on in the room. Suddenly, he hears a creaking floorboard behind him, and he becomes aware of himself as seen by the Other. He is thus filled with shame for he perceives himself as he would perceive someone else doing what he was doing, as a Peeping Tom.

Another characteristic feature of the Look is that no Other really needs to have been there: It is quite possible that the creaking floorboard was nothing but the movement of an old house; the Look isn't some kind of mystical telepathic experience of the actual way the other sees you (there may also have been someone there, but he could have not noticed that you were there, or he could be another Peeping Tom who just wants to join you).

Reason

Emphasizing action, freedom, and decision as fundamental, existentialists oppose themselves to rationalism and positivism. That is, they argue against definitions of human beings as primarily rational. Rather, existentialists look at where people find meaning. Existentialism asserts that people actually make decisions based on what has meaning to them rather than what is rational. The rejection of reason as the source of meaning is a common theme of existentialist thought, as is the focus on the feelings of anxiety and dread that we feel in the face of our own radical freedom and our awareness of death. Kierkegaard saw rationality as a mechanism humans use to counter their existential anxiety, their fear of being in the world: "If I can believe that I am rational and everyone else is rational then I have nothing to fear and no reason to feel anxious about being free."

Like Kierkegaard, Sartre saw problems with rationality, calling it a form of "bad faith", an attempt by the self to impose structure on a world of phenomena — "the other" — that is fundamentally irrational and random. According to Sartre, rationality and other forms of bad faith hinder us from finding meaning in freedom. To try to suppress our feelings of anxiety and dread, we confine ourselves within everyday experience, Sartre asserts, thereby relinquishing our freedom and acquiescing to being possessed in one form or another by "the look" of "the other" (i.e. possessed by another person - or at least our idea of that other person). In a similar vein, Camus believed that society and religion falsely teach humans that "the other" has order and structure. For Camus, when an individual's "consciousness", longing for order, collides with "the other's" lack of order, a third element is born: "absurdity".

The Absurd

The notion of the Absurd contains the idea that there is no meaning to be found in the world beyond what meaning we give to it. This meaninglessness also encompasses the amorality or "unfairness" of the world. This contrasts with "karmic" ways of thinking in which "bad things don't happen to good people"; to the world, metaphorically speaking, there is no such thing as a good person or a bad thing; what happens happens, and it may just as well happen to a good person as to a bad person. This contrasts our daily experience where most things appear to us as meaningful, and where good people do indeed, on occasion, receive some sort of "reward" for their goodness. Most existentialist thinkers, however, will maintain that this is not a necessary feature of the world, and that it definitely isn't a property of the world in-itself. Because of the world's absurdity, at any point in time, anything can happen to anyone, and a tragic event could plummet someone into direct confrontation with the Absurd. The notion of the absurd has been prominent in literature throughout history. Franz Kafka, Fyodor Dostoevsky and many of the literary works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus contain descriptions of people who encounter the absurdity of the world. Albert Camus studied the issue of "the absurd" in his essay The Myth of Sisyphus.



      “I have been reproached for suggesting that existentialism is a form of humanism: people have said to me, “But you have written in your Nausée that the humanists are wrong, you have even ridiculed a certain type of humanism, why do you now go back upon that?” In reality, the word humanism has two very different meanings.”

      “One may understand by humanism a theory which upholds man as the end-in-itself and as the supreme value. Humanism in this sense appears, for instance, in Cocteau’s story Round the World in 80 Hours, in which one of the characters declares, because he is flying over mountains in an airplane, “Man is magnificent!” This signifies that although I, personally, have not built aeroplanes I have the benefit of those particular inventions and that I, personally, being a man, can consider myself responsible for, and honored by, achievements that are peculiar to some men. It is to assume that we can ascribe value to man according to the most distinguished deeds of certain men.”

      “That kind of humanism is absurd, for only the dog or the horse would be in a position to pronounce a general judgment upon man and declare that he is magnificent, which they have never been such fools as to do - at least, not as far as I know. But neither is it admissible that a man should pronounce judgment upon Man. Existentialism dispenses with any judgment of this sort: an existentialist will never take man as the end, since man is still to be determined. And we have no right to believe that humanity is something to which we could set up a cult, after the manner of Auguste Comte. The cult of humanity ends in Comtian humanism, shut-in upon itself, and - this must be said - in Fascism. We do not want a humanism like that.”

      “But there is another sense of the word, of which the fundamental meaning is this: Man is all the time outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist; and, on the other band, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist. Since man is thus self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and center of his transcendence.”

      “There is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe) - it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation, that man can realize himself as truly human.”



Existentialism, on:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialist
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence
http://atheism.about.com/od/existentialism/a/philosophies.htm

Major concept:

Idealism is the philosophical theory which maintains that the ultimate nature of reality is based on mind or ideas. It holds that the so-called external or "real world" is inseparable from mind, consciousness, or perception.

In the philosophy of perception, idealism is contrasted with realism in which the external world is said to have a so-called absolute existence prior to, and independent of, knowledge and consciousness. Epistemological idealists (such as Kant), it is claimed, might insist that the only things which can be directly known for certain are ideas.

In the philosophy of mind, idealism is contrasted with materialism in which the ultimate nature of reality is based on physical substances. Idealism and materialism are both theories of monism as opposed to dualism and pluralism.

Idealism also refers to a tradition in Western thought which represents things in an ideal form, or as they ought to be rather than as they really are, in the fields of ethics, morality, aesthetics, and value.

Idealism is a philosophical movement in Western thought, and names a number of philosophical positions with sometimes quite different tendencies and implications in politics and ethics, for instance; although in general, at least in popular culture, philosophical idealism is associated with Plato and the school of platonism.

...

Criticism

The first criticism of Idealism that falls within the analytic philosophical framework is by one of its co-founders Moore. This 1903 seminal article, The Refutation of Idealism. This one of the first demonstrations of Moore's commitment to analysis as the proper philosophical method.

Moore proceeds by examining the Berkeleian aphorism esse est percipi: "to be is to be perceived". He examines in detail each of the three terms in the aphorism, finding that it must mean that the object and the subject are necessarily connected. So, he argues, for the idealist, "yellow" and "the sensation of yellow" are necessarily identical - to be yellow is necessarily to be experienced as yellow. But, in a move similar to the open question argument, it also seems clear that there is a difference between "yellow" and "the sensation of yellow". For Moore, the idealist is in error because "that esse is held to be percipi, solely because what is experienced is held to be identical with the experience of it".

Though far from a complete refutation, this was the first strong statement by analytic philosophy against its idealist predecessors--or at any rate against the type of idealism represented by Berkeley--this argument did not show that the GEM (in post Stove vernacular, see below) is logically invalid. Arguments advanced by Nietzsche (prior to Moore), Russell (just after Moore) & 80 years later Stove put a nail in the coffin for the "master" argument supporting (Berkeleyan) idealism.

...

for the actual tab hoping, proposition diving sport, go to:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism

also consider:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensory_perception
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_perception

Το ψηφιζω σαν το πιο ενδιαφερον ποστ στο φορουμ.....  :D :D

Να προλαβω το γνωστο σφαξιμο:
Ο Camus ειχε πει πολλακις οτι δεν ειναι υπαρξιστης και οτι δε γουσταρε καθολου που οταν ανεφεραν το Sartre(ισως ο πιο γνωστος υπαρξιστης) ανεφεραν και αυτον και αναποδα... Το παραλογο που απασχολει τον Camus (κυριως στο Μυθο του Σισυφου και στη λογοτεχνεια του της περιοδου αυτης- πχ ο Ξενος) και ιδιαιτερα σε σχεση με την πραγματικοτητα δεν απασχολει ομοιοτροπος τον Sartre που αυτοαποκαλειται υπαρξιστης. Ιδιαιτερα ο Camus το αφηνει "γοητευτικα" αναπαντητο για μενα, αν οντως υπαρχει νοημα στις πραξεις αφου στο κατω κατω οδηγησε σε ενα τελος με τις πραξεις σου(οπως ο Μερσο στο "Ο Ξενος"). Απο την αλλη ο Sartre εχει παιξει με το υπαρξιστικο τσιτατο "Η υπαρξη προηγειται της ουσιας"(Existence precedes essence) και λεει οτι εφοσον δρας δινεις και νοημα στις πραξεις σου, δηλαδη δεν υπαρχει καποιος αλλος σκοπος, νοημα κτλ περα απο αυτα που διαμορφωνεις με τη δραση σου στην καθημερινοτητα. Ο ανθρωπος δηλαδη δεν ηρθε στη γη με καποιο σκοπο ή με ζωη που εχει νοημα εκ των προτερων(αρα δεν ισχυει ας πουμε το "η οικογενεια ειναι ο προορισμος του ανθρωπου" κτλ), αλλα ο ανθρωπος προσδιοριζει τι νοημα θα δωσει στη ζωη του, επιλεγοντας και δρωντας. Συνοπτικα πρωτα γεννιεσαι(αρχιζεις να υπαρχεις) και στη συνεχεια ζεις(αποκτας ουσια).. Μετα απ'αυτο ειναι σημαντικες οι εννοιες ελευθερια, επιλογη, κακη πιστη, δεσμευση και ευθυνη. O Camus δινει τελειως διαφορετικη αποψη για την ελευθερια που ειναι μηδενιστικη-απολυτη, ο Sartre της θετει τα πλαισια της επιλογης-αρα και ευθυνης. Και οι δυο ομως συμφωνουν οτι η ελευθερια σου χρεωνει και ευθυνες. Για να κλεισω, o Sartre εχει ασχοληθει με το παραλογο στη Ναυτια του, οπου ο πρωταγωνιστης ειναι ενας ιστορικος σε μια μικρη Γαλλικη πολη οπου συντασει τη βιογραφια ενος ζωηρου Μαρκησιου με ιντριγκες, περιπετεις κτλ(κατι σαν του Μητσοτακη), κραταει ημερολογιο αλλα εχει τις κρισεις νοηματος, τη Ναυτια και τελικα αποφασιζει πως το μονο που εχει εκ των προτερων νοημα και ειναι ερεισμα του ανθρωπου, ειναι η Τεχνη.

Αυτα.
Για τον υπαρξισμο του Sartre συνοπτικο και περιεκτικο ειναι το "ο Υπαρξισμος ειναι ενας Ανθρωπισμος", του ιδιου, που ειναι μια διαλεξη στην οποια δινει τα βασικα στοιχεια της υπαρξιστικης φιλοσοφιας, τα σημαντικοτερα απο τα οποια ειναι συμπτηγμενα στα παραπανω που ποσταρε ο Ex_Mechanus, αλλα τα αναλυει εκτενεστερα σε αλλες πραγαματειες...

http://www.philosopher.org.uk/

Στο τέλος του 20ου αιώνα, η δυτική φιλοσοφική σκέψη χωριζόταν σε 2 πολύ γενικές κατηγορίες/παραδόσεις: την Αναλυτική Φιλοσοφία και την Ηπειρωτική. Η Αναλυτική είναι κυρίαρχη στον αγγλοσαξωνικό κόσμο (ΗΠΑ και Μ. Βρετανία κυρίως), ενώ η Ηπειρωτική σε όλο τον υπολοιπο "δυτικό κόσμο" (αλλά και στην πρωην ΕΣΣΔ σε κάποιο βαθμο) με έμφαση στην Ευρώπη. Η Αναλυτική είναι σχετικά συμπαγής στις ιδέες της, ενω η Ηπειρωτική είναι πιο πολύπλευρη περιλαμβάνοντας και εγελιανούς ιδεαλιστές και μαρξιστές και μεταμοντερνιστές.

Στην Ελλάδα η διανόηση κυρίως βρίσκεται στο Ηπειρωτικό ρευμα.


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Analytic philosophy (sometimes analytical philosophy) is a style of philosophy that came to dominate English-speaking countries in the 20th century. In the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Scandinavia, Australia, and New Zealand, the vast majority of university philosophy departments identify themselves as "analytic" departments.



The term "analytic philosophy" can refer to:

  1)  A broad philosophical tradition characterized by an emphasis on clarity and argument (often achieved via modern formal logic and analysis of language) and a respect for the natural sciences.

  2)  The more specific set of developments of early 20th-century philosophy that were the historical antecedents of the broad sense: e.g., the work of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, and logical positivists.




In this latter, narrower sense, analytic philosophy is identified with specific philosophical commitments (many of which are rejected by contemporary analytic philosophers), such as:


  *  The logical positivist principle that there are not any specifically philosophical truths and that the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. This may be contrasted with the traditional foundationalism, which considers philosophy to be a special science (i.e. discipline of knowledge) that investigates the fundamental reasons and principles of everything. Consequently, many analytic philosophers have considered their inquiries to be continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences.
 
  *   The principle that the logical clarification of thoughts can only be achieved by analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions. The logical form of a proposition is a way of representing it (often using the formal grammar and symbolism of a logical system) to display its similarity with all other propositions of the same type. However, analytic philosophers disagree widely about the correct logical form of ordinary language.[10]

  *The rejection of sweeping philosophical systems in favour of attention to detail, or ordinary language.


According to a characteristic paragraph by Bertrand Russell:

    "Modern analytical empiricism [...] differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, in comparison with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought; I have also no doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble."

Analytic philosophy is often understood in contrast to other philosophical traditions, most notably continental philosophy, and also Indian philosophy, Thomism, and Marxism.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy



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Continental philosophy is a set of 19th- and 20th-century philosophical traditions from mainland Europe. This sense of the term originated among English-speaking philosophers in the second half of the 20th century, who used it to refer to a range of thinkers and traditions outside the analytic movement. Continental philosophy includes the following movements: German idealism, phenomenology, existentialism (and its antecedents, such as the thought of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), hermeneutics, structuralism, post-structuralism, French feminism, psychoanalytic theory, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and related branches of Western Marxism.

It is difficult to identify non-trivial claims that would be common to all the preceding philosophical movements. The term "continental philosophy", like "analytic philosophy", lacks clear definition and may mark merely a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views. Simon Glendinning has suggested that the term was originally more pejorative than descriptive, functioning as a label for types of western philosophy rejected or disliked by analytic philosophers. Babette Babich emphasizes the political basis of the distinction, still an issue when it comes to appointments and book contracts.Nonetheless, Michael E. Rosen has ventured to identify common themes that typically characterize continental philosophy.

  *   First, continental philosophers generally reject scientism, the view that the natural sciences are the only or most accurate way of understanding phenomena. This contrasts with many analytic philosophers who consider their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences. Continental philosophers often argue that science depends upon a "pre-theoretical substrate of experience" (a version of Kantian conditions of possible experience or the phenomenological "lifeworld") and that scientific methods are inadequate to fully understand such conditions of intelligibility.

   *  Second, continental philosophy usually considers these conditions of possible experience as variable: determined at least partly by factors such as context, space and time, language, culture, or history. Thus continental philosophy tends toward historicism. Where analytic philosophy tends to treat philosophy in terms of discrete problems, capable of being analyzed apart from their historical origins (much as scientists consider the history of science inessential to scientific inquiry), continental philosophy typically suggests that "philosophical argument cannot be divorced from the textual and contextual conditions of its historical emergence".

   *  Third, continental philosophy typically holds that human agency can change these conditions of possible experience: "if human experience is a contingent creation, then it can be recreated in other ways". Thus continental philosophers tend to take a strong interest in the unity of theory and practice, and often see their philosophical inquiries as closely related to personal, moral, or political transformation. This tendency is very clear in the Marxist tradition ("philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it"), but is also central in existentialism and post-structuralism.

  *   A final characteristic trait of continental philosophy is an emphasis on metaphilosophy. In the wake of the development and success of the natural sciences, continental philosophers have often sought to redefine the method and nature of philosophy. In some cases (such as German idealism or phenomenology), this manifests as a renovation of the traditional view that philosophy is the first, foundational, a priori science. In other cases (such as hermeneutics, critical theory, or structuralism), it is held that philosophy investigates a domain that is irreducibly cultural or practical. And some continental philosophers (such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the later Heidegger, or Derrida) doubt whether any conception of philosophy can coherently achieve its stated goals.


Ultimately, the foregoing themes derive from a broadly Kantian thesis that knowledge, experience, and reality are bound and shaped by conditions best understood through philosophical reflection rather than exclusively empirical inquiry.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental_philosophy